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1. Introduction: Toward a Joyful Transhumanism 
 
Many have noticed that there are some affinities between the contemporary transhumanist 
movement and Nietzsche’s philosophy of the Übermensch or the Superhuman.
1
 Perhaps Sorgner 
(2017a, b, c, d)
2
 is the commentator who has done the most to defend the view that these affinities 
are real and that they run deep. He believes that Nietzsche and the transhumanists share important 
similarities in fundamental principles and aims, and, particularly, in their belief in the 
enhancement of humanity by the overcoming of human limitations. While for Nietzsche this 
enhancement was to be achieved through cultural education, given the structural analogy between 
education and technology, Sorgner concludes that Nietzsche probably would not have opposed the 
transhumanist goal of using technological enhancement in order to realize the superhuman 




 I’ll follow Loeb’s and Tinsley’s (2019) translation of Übermensch as Superhuman. However, unlike them, I 
am not inclined to read the superhuman as the conception of a new superior species that can replace humanity. I 
interpret the superhuman as the ideal of a new spiritually superior type of human. In my view, we can think of the 
ideal as entreating us to develop the sort of profound spiritual qualities that would put a human being to shame, so 
that, much in the same way as today we would feel ashamed of perceiving in ourselves comportments that remind us of 
the spiritual limitations of being an ape, so too we would feel ashamed of discovering in ourselves comportments that 
remind us of the spiritual limitations of being human (Z.I. ‘Prologue’ 3). Exploring these issues further is a topic for a 
different essay, but among the things this spiritual labor of enhancement might require is the overcoming of the default 
moral qualities that generally typify humankind, such as guilt, and, perhaps, compassion. In what follows, I provide an 
example of what the overcoming of guilt might entail. In my reading, the overcoming of these spiritual limitations 
doesn’t constitute a radical break with our humanity culminating in a new species. This is partly because—as I argued in 
Zamosc (2015b)—among the things that eternal recurrence might teach us is that the ideal of the superhuman is only 
imperfectly realizable. 
2
 The debate is usefully collected in Tuncel (2017a). 
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While I don’t have qualms with the transhumanist aspiration to employ technological 
means to break human cognitive, emotional, or physical limitations in order to develop capacities 
that greatly exceed the maximum attainable by any currently living person (Bostrom 2008), I am 
skeptical about whether such a policy of enhancement would capture what Nietzsche meant by the 
superhuman, and—like some scholars—I suspect that Nietzsche probably would’ve been a critic of 
much of the transhumanist movement, like he was of the modern science of his time (e.g. Ansell-
Pearson 1997; Skowron 2013; Babich 2017). Nietzsche’s criticisms of science, however, were not 
meant as an indictment of all science, for he thought we could become practitioners of a more 
joyful science. Similarly, the transhumanist movement could benefit from a fresh philosophical 
rapprochement with Nietzsche’s philosophy so as to secure a joyful version of itself. 
 
In this essay, I contend that securing such joyful transhumanism requires coming to terms 
with Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which Nietzsche considered his most important book. In particular, 
following Loeb (2017), I’ll argue that transhumanists cannot productively claim affinity to 
Nietzsche’s philosophy until they incorporate the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which some of 
them are reluctant to do: e.g. More (2017). Sorgner himself, while conceding that transhumanists 
may benefit from taking eternal recurrence seriously, insists that the doctrine isn’t really necessary 
for achieving the movement’s goals (Sorgner 2017c: 164). In the ensuing analysis, I hope to prove 
him wrong on that score. 
 
My argument will proceed as follows: in section 2, I discuss some of the ways in which 
Zarathustra calls attention to the worry of confusing the superhuman with a false kind of 
transcendence. Section 3, outlines Zarathustra’s diagnosis of why this danger exists and how the 
doctrine of eternal recurrence might prevent it, thereby guaranteeing that the superhuman ideal—or 
any ideal that might be reasonably integrated into its orbit—won’t be suspect. However, against 
Loeb, I suggest in section 4 that the solution doesn’t consist in the acquisition of a new skill, but 
rather in cultivating a love of life that allows us to affirmatively embrace our tragic destiny of always 
remaining transitional creatures. Finally, in section 5, I argue that Zarathustra is a propaedeutic to 
the art of love of life and, thus, that it’s unlikely that its pedagogical purpose can be achieved 
through technological interventions like those envisioned by transhumanists. 
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2. The Broken Wings of False Transcendence 
 
From the start, Zarathustra warns its readers against confusing the superhuman ideal with 
false or sickly versions of it. The prologue’s tightrope scene prefigures this theme: “man is a rope 
fastened between animal and superhuman—a rope over an abyss”, Zarathustra tells us, just a few 
moments before the tightrope walker steps into the scene to metaphorically enact the very 
transition from animality to superhumanity being mentioned (Z.I ‘Prologue’, 4-6; translation 
modified).
3
 His movement along the rope, however, is abruptly interrupted midpoint by the jester 
who, in his rush to get to the other side, leaps over him, making him fall toward the crowd and his 
eventual death. The import of the episode is hard to miss: humanity needs to transition to 
superhumanity but rushing or making a mockery of the whole process will result in our and the 
ideal’s perdition. 
 
Other chapters pick up this theme. In “On the Hinterworldly”, Zarathustra himself admits 
to having pursued problematic projects of transcendence in the past, like those commonly 
championed by hinterworldly people, and suggests that suffering and impotence are the reasons 
behind these transcendental miscarriages. Indeed, prefiguring the theme of “On the Despisers of 
the Body”, Zarathustra suggests that hinterworldly people are dissatisfied with their own body and 
would like to “jump out of their skin”; and, in language that strongly recalls the jester’s hasty 
attempt to reach the end of the rope in one lethal jump, he claims that it’s “weariness that wants its 
ultimate with one great leap, with a death leap; a poor unknowing weariness that no longer even 
wants to will: that created all gods and hinterworlds” (Z.I, ‘Hinterworldly’). 
 
In the chapter “On the Tree on the Mountain”, echoes of this leaping jester-like figure 
appear to hover over the noble youngster who confesses to being weary of the heights and 
ashamed of all his climbing, for he “often skip[s] steps when [he] climbs” (Z.I, ‘Tree’). His jester-
like hastiness frustrates his efforts at rising, like the tree, “high beyond humans and animals”. 
Zarathustra suggests that it’s his spirit’s lack of freedom that’s responsible for his failures and warns 
that his weariness can lead him to become—much like the prologue’s jester—“a mocker, an 
annihilator” (Ibid.). This possibility seems related, again, to contempt for the body. Zarathustra 
 
3
 I’ll use the Cambridge edition of Nietzsche’s works, indicating translation alterations in parenthesis. 
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reintroduces the metaphor of the broken wings used to characterize the transcendental poeticizing 
of hinterworldly humans in his exhortation to the youngster not to follow the path of those nobles 
who lost their heroic soul and became libertines. They said: “spirit is lust too” and, in doing so, 
“the wings of their spirit broke, and now it crawls around and soils what it gnaws” (Z.I, ‘Tree’). 
Since contempt for the body is responsible for fracturing the wings of the hinterworldly, 
presumably the same is true for the libertine. 
 
This reading can be confirmed if we reflect further on the resonances between the claim 
that spirit is also lust and the overall naturalist and reductionist tendency of the “awakened and 
knowing one” in “On the Despisers of the Body”, who has expressed the conviction that: “body I 
am through and through and nothing besides, and soul is just a word for something on the body” 
(Z.I, ‘Despisers’). For the knowing person, the conceptual categories of the soul, such as “spirit”, 
“ego”, and the like, are really epiphenomenal manifestations of the body, and its instruments and 
tools, for, as Zarathustra puts it, “the creative body created spirit for itself as the hand of its will” 
(Ibid.). The initial reductionist remark of the “awakened one who knows”, however, is actually 
contraposed to the child’s claim that: “body am I and soul”; which was followed by Zarathustra’s 
rhetorical question: “And why should one not speak like children?” (Ibid.). The question invites 
readers to endorse the child’s perspective, making it ambiguous whether Zarathustra really means 
to wholeheartedly sanction the beliefs of the awakened and knowing person. This suspicion is 
compounded by the fact that, as we know from an earlier speech, the child is the ultimate 
transformation of the spirit in its path to liberation and self-overcoming (Z.I, ‘Metamorphoses’). 
Our reflections on the plight of the noble youngster throw some unexpected light on this situation 
(which has been the subject of some debate in the literature)
4
 and confirm that Zarathustra is in fact 
aligning himself with the child’s position. For consider that the metaphor of the broken wings that 
was mentioned in conjunction with the impulse to despise the body, contrasts with the 
metamorphosed child-spirit and its fully-abled “butterfly wings” that’s the subject of “On the Three 
Metamorphoses”. 
 
If Zarathustra is endorsing the child’s position, then his contraposing it to the remark of the 
one who is “awake and knows” is presumably meant to signal that this latter character is in danger 
 
4
 Gerhardt (2006); Riccardi (2015); Daigle (2011). 
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of becoming one of those despisers of the body that are the real subject matter of his speech, if he 
has not already become one. Indeed, some of the language in Zarathustra’s speech appears to 
indicate that the knowing person is on the verge of despising his body. Take this way of addressing 
the knowing person: “Your self laughs at your ego and its proud leaps. ‘What are these leaps and 
flights of thought to me?’ It says to itself” (Z.I, ‘Despisers’). It’s hard not to hear in this laughter, a 
jester-like contempt, an impulse to humiliate the pride of the ego (also that of his “spirit” and 
“sense” that had been called “vain”), which—by the knowing one’s own admission—is just the body 
itself, hence, an impulse of the body to despise itself. My suggestion is not that the language 
confirms that the awakened one despises his body, but that it shows that he is already well on his 
way to doing so. Another point to consider is that, in Zarathustra’s universe, being “awake” is not 
univocally positive. Among the reasons that Zarathustra singles to explain the noble youngster’s 
disgust and weariness at his own climbing, is the fact that his seeking has made him “sleep-deprived 
and over-awake” (Z.I, ‘Tree’). Later, in the soothsayer’s divination we’ll encounter a similar idea: 
“we have already become too weary to die”, the soothsayer will say, “now we continue to wake and 
we live on—in burial chambers!” (Z.II, ‘Soothsayer’; emphasis added). Being awake is, thus, not 
necessarily a blessing for the “one who knows”, and Zarathustra’s seeming endorsement of the 
child’s position might be read as implying that—to fulfill the self’s longstanding desire to “create 
beyond itself”—the creative body better adopt the daydreaming attitude of the child who, in truly 
transfigured fashion, turns the spirit, not so much into the hands, as into the wings of his will (Z.I, 
‘Despisers’). The lesson seems to be that we can avoid turning Zarathustra’s ideal of 
superhumanity into a destructive mockery of itself only when we learn to dream in active mode, 
while awake, and spiritualize our body by giving it wings. 
 
3. Eternal Recurrence and the Will’s Liberation 
 
 Let this suffice to demonstrate the book’s concern with alerting the reader to the dangers of 
turning Zarathustra’s superhuman ideal into a buffoonish caricature of itself. Given these repeated 
warnings, it’s not surprising that critics of the modern transhumanist project have argued that 
transhumanists fall prey to the very dangers Zarathustra worries about and instantiate false 
transcendences. 
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Both Babich (2017) and Ansell-Pearson (1997), for instance, suggest that modern 
transhumanism is a form of the ascetic ideal, which Nietzsche considers inimical to life insofar as it 
seeks to produce an “improved humanity” that’s really no more than a weakened and flattened out 
version of ourselves (GM III.21). Babich, moreover, calls attention to the fact that there are 
oppressive, totalitarian and oligarchic tendencies animating much of the transhumanist movement 
(Babich 2017: 109-112). Following similar lines of reasoning, both Tuncel and Woodward, argue 
that, by seeking to eliminate suffering, transhumanism alienates itself from any recognizable 
Nietzschean project of transcendence which will necessarily include pain and suffering as essential 
components (Tuncel 2017b: 226-9; Woodward 2017: 239-40). Yet others, like Skowron, attempt 
to show that the transhumanist ideals of developing a happy, healthy and—if possible—immortal 
life, are ones that Nietzsche more readily equates with the Last Man and, certainly, not of the sort 
that the superhuman would instantiate (Skowron 2013: 258-9; 270-3). Even those, like Bamford, 
who adopt more neutral, perhaps even favorable, positions with respect to technological 
enhancement, raise concerns about the values animating much of these efforts. For Nietzsche, 
traditional morality is likely to stupefy not promote the self-overcoming of humanity. Thus, 
Bamford suggests that transhumanists would benefit from taking more seriously Nietzsche’s 
critique of the morality of compassion that seems to frame most of their assumptions about what 
type of moral enhancements ought to be pursued (Bamford 2017: 215-18). 
 
 I broadly agree with much of what these and other commentators have said concerning the 
relation between Nietzsche’s philosophy and contemporary transhumanism. However, I also agree 
with some things Sorgner says in reply to critics. Sorgner correctly notes that there are no necessary 
connections between transhumanism and the kind of problematic positions with which these 
interpreters appear to want to saddle the movement (Sorgner 2017c: 141; 150-154). In fact, there’s 
a rich debate concerning the aims and methods, as well as the general political and ethical 
orientation of transhumanism.
5
 If there’s something that unites this diversity of views, it’s the idea 
that we should employ technology to break the limits of our humanity and significantly alter our 
lives. Beyond this very general statement of intent, however, participants in the movement answer 
the question of how to carry out their mission in accordance with the overarching narratives they 
respectively favor, concerning what human beings should become and what type of life it’s best to 
 
5
 Ranisch and Sorgner (2014) discuss some of these issues. 
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lead. Still, as Sorgner points out, there may be some general tendencies that are discernible. For 
instance, most transhumanists appear to be naturalists, who reject metaphysical dualisms and 
uphold a strict this-worldly understanding of reality in which minds are thoroughly embodied. 
Sorgner often uses these perceived commonalities to defend his own version of Nietzschean 
transhumanism against criticisms. Accordingly, he argues that, since most transhumanists are 
naturalists, they cannot be in the grips of the ascetic ideal, which aims at otherworldly goals and 
aspires to an immaterial personal immortality that’s simply incompatible with a naturalistic stance 
(Sorgner 2017c: 152, 157-8; 2017d: 251). 
 
One could, of course, quibble with some of these claims. After all, from a Nietzschean 
point of view, whether or not transhumanism instantiates the ascetic ideal will depend wholly on 
what one understands this ideal to mean in Nietzsche’s philosophy, which is a thorny question. 
Thus, instead of engaging in a tug-of-war for the right to call the transhumanist movement an ally or 
an enemy of Nietzschean philosophy, I believe that we would be better served by considering 
some of the ways in which Nietzsche’s ideas could help advance the debate along more productive 
paths. And it’s here, I think, that Zarathustra can prove useful to stir the discussion further in the 
right direction. 
 
I began by calling attention to the manner in which Nietzsche’s book alerts us to the 
difficulties involved in ensuring that the pursuit of the superhuman is genuine and salutary. 
Assuming that Zarathustra’s worries are warranted, and that the transhumanist project of 
technological enhancement is not incompatible with the superhuman, then presumably the same 
difficulties he worries about would be operative in evaluating whether transhumanism constitutes 
an instance of false or sickly transcendence. Notice that here an appeal to perceived commonalities 
within the movement will simply not do. Even if naturalism is representative of transhumanism as a 
whole, on its own, this feature won’t guarantee the purity of any transcendent effort. That was 
Zarathustra’s point in warning the youngster about being overly awake and vigilant, in the manner 
of those knowing people who trust too much in their naturalistic beliefs about the materiality of 
their ego and the thoroughly embodied conceptions of their spirit. Those conceptions and beliefs 
can end up diverting our transcendent efforts into projects that, in reality, break the wings of our 
spirit and, instead of contributing to its growth beyond the human, merely turn it into a more 
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sophisticated version of its very human-all-too-human animal self: i.e. into a libertine. Libertinism, 
then, is actually a veiled, unconfessed hatred of the body and the earth, posing as if it were a 
celebration of those things; it attempts to pass abandonment of the spirit to its bodily pleasures for 
a love of earth and the body, when, in fact, it expresses a weary hatred of those things and their 
immanent, but also transcendent, possibilities. 
 
This kind of danger should be especially salient to transhumanists who often seem moved 
by motives that resemble those that worry Zarathustra. Not only are some transhumanists, like 
Kurzweil (2005), constantly inveighing against what they perceive to be romanticized notions of 
death and our biological limits, but they seem eager to promote an enhancement that sounds just 
like technologically enabled libertinism. The goal is to furnish our animal self with more fanciful 
body-gadgets and abilities that will enable it to pursue its earthly pleasures in heretofore 
unimagined ways. Against such “crawling” libertinisms with broken wings masquerading as genuine 
transcendent projects, Nietzsche contraposes what, in On the Genealogy of Morals, he will call that 
“cheerful asceticism of an animal become fledged and divine, who rather than repose in life, floats 
above it” (GM III.8; translation modified). Such positive asceticism is the great promise that’s 
contained in the image of the genuine philosopher that’s capable of utilizing the most dangerous 
things, like all ascetic practices, not as bridges to nothingness, but as bridges to independence and 
freedom instead (GM II.16, III.7, 10-11). But how is this great promise to be realized, if as 
Nietzsche also suggests, until now genuine philosophers had to creep about in the multiple guises 
of that “gloomy caterpillar form” of the ascetic priest (GM III.10); so that even analytic, 
continental, naturalist, transcendental, or the like, types of modern scientists and scholars today 
continue—often in secret, unacknowledged ways—to incarnate the weary, overly awake, hating 
disposition toward life and the body that’s responsible for derailing all our efforts at growing 
beyond the animal and the human? 
  
 Fortunately for us—and perhaps also for transhumanists—Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is also 
concerned with providing a cure for these problems so as to ensure that our transcendent efforts 
don’t flounder. Indeed, by Nietzsche’s own admission, the story is constructed around the doctrine 
of eternal recurrence, which constitutes the basic conception of the book as a whole (EH, ‘Books’ 
Z 1). This doctrine is inextricably connected to the superhuman because it’s the thought that, when 
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confronted and affirmatively overcome, allows Zarathustra to evade the sort of weariness that could 
spoil his superhuman ideal in the ways described. Loeb is, therefore, correct when he complains 
about the transhumanist strategy of cherry-picking Nietzsche’s thoughts while dismissing the 
philosophical connections that he himself established between those thoughts, on the 
hermeneutically uncharitable assumption that he must have been confused about their relation 
(Loeb 2017: 85-6).
6
 If transhumanists find Nietzsche’s philosophy sufficiently valuable to 
appropriate his idea of superhumanity and claim him as ally, then perhaps they should take more 
seriously Nietzsche’s suggestion that eternal recurrence is an essential component of his 
philosophical project. Doing so should lead them to conclude, as Loeb suggests, “that eternal 
recurrence is actually required for there to be any transhumanist progress in the first place” (Loeb 
2017: 91). My reasons for agreeing with Loeb’s observation, however, are importantly different 
from the ones he gives. To appreciate this difference, let me describe in a little more detail the 
place that eternal recurrence occupies in Zarathustra’s story. 
 
Book two begins by warning its readers—yet again—about the dangers confronting 
Zarathustra’s teaching of the superhuman, which his enemies threaten to distort (Z.II, ‘Mirror’). 
Thus, in the following speech “On the Blessed Isles”, Zarathustra tries to articulate again what he 
takes to be the importance of his teaching. Among the things we can surmise from his speech is 
that the superhuman is a conjecture that represents the highest fruit and version of the creative will. 
Since Zarathustra suggests in this chapter that his teachings are like ripe figs that fall from the tree 
to his friends and brothers, this is one of the ways in which Nietzsche connects Zarathustra’s 
teaching of superhumanity both to his early philosophy and to the works that came after 
Zarathustra. In the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche had suggested that the way to justify life was to 
pursue the cultural project of procreating the genius, “the highest fruit of life” (UM III.3). By the 
time we reach the Genealogy, the free personality that’s the genius has metamorphosed into that of 
the sovereign individual, who is a master of a free will, and the ripest fruit that’s promised as the 
final product of the cultural labor of humankind on itself; a fruit and a promise that’s described as 
the paradoxical task that nature appears to have set itself in the case of the human animal, but that 
seems, as of yet, unfulfilled (see GM II.1 & 2). Zarathustra’s attempt to redirect humankind toward 
the superhuman can be read as an attempt to truly fulfil the task and to finally realize the great 
 
6
 Cf. Skowron 2013: 269-70. 
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promise of freedom that’s contained, still in chrysalis form, in the creative will of the human being.
7
 
That creative will, after all, as Zarathustra insists, is a liberator and joy-bringer that can redeem us 
from the suffering that’s required to chisel out of the stone of humankind the, for now, beautiful 
sleeping image of the superhuman child with butterfly wings (Z.II, ‘Blessed’). 
 
 As the events of book two unfold, however, we discover that the creative will cannot really 
fulfill its destiny of being liberator and redeemer, because it itself is a prisoner of the past, which it 
regards as an unmovable stone against which it gnashes its teeth in impotent melancholy (Z.II, 
‘Redemption’). In prior work, I’ve argued that the chapter “On Redemption” where this theme is 
developed, outlines two basic forms of the will’s impotence: a retrospective and a prospective kind 
of impotence (Zamosc 2015b). The former usually manifests itself in the experience of so-called 
negative affective responses like guilt and shame. The recollection of past deeds that turned out 
badly, especially those in the execution of which we failed to live up to some moral expectation we 
had of ourselves, can be the source of great anguish that lingers on in the present and even 
threatens to spill over and blot our future. This is why Zarathustra claims that the most secret 
melancholy of the will is that it cannot break time or will backwards (Z.II, ‘Redemption’). A 
reverse causation or a “backward-willing” seems like the perfect solution since it would allow us to 
alter the past and make it more agreeable to our conscience, by literally erasing or modifying our 
causal role in bringing about the events that now torment us. The second form of impotence 
mentioned consists in a prospective powerlessness that manifests itself in our incapacity to stop the 
rapacious passage of time and to prevent the present and the future from becoming the past. Thus, 
the melancholic misery we experience with this kind of impotence will express itself in things like 
longing and nostalgia for our bygone days, as well as in the anxious anticipation of aging, in which 
we expect to be subjected to the unrelentless process of going kerflooey; to say nothing of our fear 
at the prospect of that ultimate demise which will be our death. Here, again, a kind of backward-
willing might seem like a perfect remedy insofar as it might “rewind the clock”, so to speak, and 
reverse or stop the greedy advancement of time which appears to be robbing us of precious 




 Acampora (2006) and Loeb (2006) argue against identifying the sovereign individual with 
Nietzsche’s/Zarathustra’s ideal. In Zamosc (2012), I defend the view that it is Nietzsche’s ideal. 
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 Since the perfect solution to both forms of impotence seems to lie outside its jurisdiction, 
given that it seems impossible to move the stone that’s the past and change it by willing backwards, 
Zarathustra suggests that the will is forced to devise a different remedy for its misery, which quickly 
turns into anger. This remedy consists in venting its incapacity to change the past into punitive acts 
of vengeance against everything that’s capable of suffering, including itself, in the hope that this 
might expiate the leaden feeling produced by the past and finally alleviate it. Zarathustra calls this 
solution a futile and insane “madness,” because “no deed can be annihilated; how could it be 
undone through punishment?” (Ibid.).
8
 Indeed, realizing that the past cannot be undone by 
producing harm, should lead us to conclude that our melancholic ill-will toward the past will never 
really stop weighing on us, save on that moment when we ourselves cease to be, at which point the 
solution would come too late and be most unwelcomed. It’s perhaps for this reason that 
Zarathustra claims that the will’s vindictive attitude against the past ultimately crystalizes in a “fable 
of madness” that recommends, as final solution, the attempt to transform the creative will into a 
“not-willing”, on the assumption that willing itself is inherently evil and the source of all misery 
(Ibid.). This insane, nihilistic, will-denying solution is an expression of what we may call the “sinful 
conscience” that lies at the center of the ascetic ideal and of all ascetic religions, like Christianity 
and Buddhism, and that’s also championed in Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy. 
 
This nihilistic attitude had been introduced just moments before by the soothsayer who 
predicted that the earth was destined to become an infertile land populated by walking-dead 
humans who tout the fatalistic doctrine: “everything is empty, everything is the same, everything 
was” (Z.II, ‘Soothsayer’). Thus, what stands in the way of Zarathustra’s teaching of the superhuman 
is the very real threat that the future of humankind will get irretrievably lodged in the direction of 
these nihilistic attitudes and doctrines of will-denial that have their origin in the creative will’s 
powerlessness with respect to the past. Eternal recurrence, then, is the thought that will allow 
Zarathustra to avoid this outcome and dislodge the will from its current trajectory towards the 
sinful, nihilistic denial of itself.
9
 Importantly—given his concluding remarks—if eternal recurrence 
allows Zarathustra to redeem his creative will from its impotence with respect to the past, it must 
 
8
 Loeb thinks “madness” doesn’t reveal what the will’s powerlessness consist in (Loeb 2010: 178-9; n.9). But, 
since the will is susceptible to this “madness”, presumably the solutions it affords indicate what’s on the will’s mind. On 
my reading: principally guilt/regret for past events it cannot alter. Cf. WS 323. 
9
 In his convalescent speech Zarathustra relates eternal recurrence to the soothsayer’s saying; and, in the next 
speech, he suggests that he liberated his soul by strangling the strangler called sin (Z.III, ‘Longing’; ‘Convalescent’ 2). 
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do so by teaching it not just reconciliation with time but something higher than all reconciliation, 
which—Zarathustra implies—would be equivalent to teaching the will to will backwards (Z.II, 
‘Redemption’). 
 
4. Love’s Backward-Willing 
 
 For Loeb, this something higher than all reconciliation is a new skill he calls prospective 
memory: the ability to actually will backwards by influencing the past from the vantage point of the 
present and the future (Loeb 2010: 173-206; 2017: 92-3). This ability requires the knowledge and 
truth of cosmological recurrence, in which every event will repeat itself in exactly the same order 
for all eternity, but—importantly—it doesn’t give Zarathustra the capacity to alter the past, since, by 
his own admission, the past is unchangeable (Loeb 2010: 178-9; 188-9). Still, Loeb insists that 
prospective memory constitutes a real power over time because it allows the will to influence the 
past’s determination of the present and impose its creative design on an open-ended future, 
thereby overcoming the soothsayer’s prophecy that everything will always be the same (2017: 91; 
2010: 155). As I understand it, the idea is that, from its present moment, the will can implant 
memories into its past younger versions that will enable it to see itself as actually helping to 
produce those life-moments that it was indeed causally implicated in producing, particularly those 
moments that it wants eternally returned to it. On Loeb’s reading, this new recognition, that’s 
retroactively enabled from the present through subconscious mechanisms, lessens the creative 
will’s feeling of impotence toward the past, because it allows it to recognize what was done as done 
in that way and not otherwise, precisely because of its present creative willing (Loeb 2010: 179). 
Thus, Loeb suggest, backward-willing allows Zarathustra to become the artist creator of his own life 
by enabling him to intentionally unify the fragmented, accidental aspects of his past, making them 
necessary to his perfected future self (Loeb 2010: 189). 
 
This is the aspect that’s most difficult to understand about Loeb’s insightful and highly 
thought-provoking reading, and—admittedly—I am not sure that I fully grasp how the past is 
supposed to be influenced by the present self’s new mnemonic power, where that influence is not 
to be understood in, what I take to be, the usual, straightforward sense of a causal power to alter 
events; in this case, to alter the events of the past. Regardless, given that Loeb admits that such a 
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retrospective influence cannot change the past, it seems to me that the solution it affords to the 
will’s predicament—as outlined above—won’t be fully satisfactory and might even make matters 
worse. In particular, I think that this kind of backward-willing doesn’t really help the creative will to 
cope with its retrospective powerlessness. For, pace Loeb, the problem of retrospective 
powerlessness is not that the will cannot regard itself “as having now had any creative effect or 
influence on [its] past” (Loeb 2010: 179). Instead, the problem is that the will cannot really erase 
the causal contribution that it actually made on the past and that now has come back to torment it. 
At least, I think that this is the more natural way to read Zarathustra’s suggestion that the will is 
“impotent against that which has been” and that “it is an evil spectator of everything past” (Z.II, 
‘Redemption’; translation modified). What the will cannot do is stop seeing itself as evil 
contributor of what it has actually done.
10
 Precisely its very real influence, back then, on the past 
having come to be what it already has become, is what the will feels bad about and would like to 
change. But what’s already done cannot be undone. Notice that in the context of this problem, 
learning that the will has the ability to somehow influence its past actions from its present or future 
self by inserting subconscious messages into its past self’s mind through its newly discovered 
mnemonic power, will simply add insult to injury. Our dissatisfaction with our past actions would 
become more tormenting, if we became aware of our ability to send ourselves messages into that 
past in order to issue proper warnings and advices to our older selves. After all, whatever advice 
that ability may be able to encode into the past is—by hypothesis—causally ineffective in altering the 
regrettable outcome that now torments us; our ability to perceive the presence of this causally 






 For Nietzsche, evil is associated with the production of harm (GM I.10-11). This indicates that the will’s 
recollection of the past is hurtful, which normally signals that guilt or regret is involved. This explains why “sinfulness” 
(the real target of Nietzsche’s critique; Zamosc 2012) will quickly become the main issue. 
11
 Loeb would say that Zarathustra’s present power to influence the past ensures that he doesn’t feel guilty 
about his past or wants to change it, because he has perfected his life by introducing unity and meaning into it, so 
there’s no knife that’s stabbing him. But if—in the moment he is encountering eternal recurrence—Zarathustra doesn’t 
experience retrospective powerlessness in the form of guilt, then he is not really mirroring the will’s problem with the 
past—as outlined above—, and his overcoming of eternal recurrence will not help the human will deal with its guilt and 
overcome its impotence. If, on the other hand, Zarathustra experiences guilt when he encounters eternal recurrence, 
then the question is how backward-willing unity into his life without altering or changing the cause of the guilt he is 
feeling (i.e. the actual past he now regrets), would nonetheless allow him to get rid of that guilt (i.e. to now stop feeling 
it). One advantage of the solution I’ll offer below consists in recognizing that guilt is not eradicated at all, precisely 
because the past which causes it is not being altered. Instead, the guilt is overcome or surpassed by love, which allows 
the will to continue feeling guilty but, at the same time, to move forward from its guilt in an affirmative manner (i.e. to 
not transform guilt into sin). 
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 Despite my problem with Loeb’s interpretation of what backward-willing entails, I think 
that he is correct in arguing that it cannot involve altering the past, as some commentators assume.
12
 
He is also right in registering dissatisfaction with interpretations, such as that of Nehamas (1985: 
160), that see backward-willing as a kind of metaphorical or psychological operation whereby one 
retrospectively redescribes one’s past in an affirming manner, thereby “changing” it so that it 
becomes new and different from what it was (Loeb 2010: 187-8).
13
 As Loeb notes, Zarathustra 
denies that the past can be changed in any way. Thus, we need to understand backward-willing in a 
manner that doesn’t entail any actual alteration of the past whether metaphorically or literally. In 
my view, love is the way out of this predicament. 
 
 The kind of volitional engagement that’s involved in love could help us understand how to 
relate to something, like the past, in new, intentionally rich ways without needing to change it. Love 
involves a conative form of valuation for the beloved that can motivate us to do all sorts of things, 
but that need not motivate us to do anything in particular: we can care for the thing we love, or we 
can actively seek to promote its interests, but we can also just be in awe of it, without doing 
anything other than valuing it for what it is. Importantly, the objects of our love can be things we 
don’t have to endorse blankly or wholeheartedly. You can deeply love members of your family that 
you can’t stand to be in the same room with, because of their political views, or their religious 
values, or what have you. Nietzsche himself, who had to personally contend with this sort of thing, 
since he had a sister and a mother that he couldn’t stand, writes in The Gay Science that one 
shouldn’t assume that people who had to experience severe pain and illness in their lives are 
necessarily incapable of being well-disposed toward life for: “love of life is still possible—only one 
loves differently. It is like the love for a woman who gives us doubts” (GS, Preface.3: p.7). A 
sentiment that’s made even more poignant in Zarathustra’s confession that: “At bottom I love only 




Trying to make sense of these phenomenological aspects of love, Velleman argues that 
what’s essential to love is that “it disarms our emotional defenses toward an object in response to 
 
12
 E.g. Gooding-Williams, 2001: 219-268; Pippin, 1988: 55; Lampert, 1986: 148. 
13
 Cf. Higgins 1987: 187-88; Clark 1990: 255-60; White 1997: 114-5; Strong 2000: 235-37; Richardson 2006: 
224-225. 
14
 Cf. Z.III, ‘Longing’; Z.I, ‘Women’; BGE 216. 
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its incomparable value as a self-existent end” (Velleman 2006: 99). It strikes me that this definition 
captures something important that might help us understand why love could serve as model for the 
kind of backward-willing that Zarathustra claims to have learned through his experience of eternal 
recurrence. If the past were to become the object of our love, then what we would love would be a 
self-existent end, one that’s not to be brought about or produced by our willing since it already is. 
Thus, when we love the past, we don’t really seek to change it. Yet, in being as it is and 
unchangeable, the past—by commanding our loving attention—makes us vulnerable, in the sense of 
lowering our emotional defenses with respect to it, so that we can be affected by it in new ways that 
can unleash in us different motivational responses. A loving disposition toward the past is a willing, 
and a willingness, to allow oneself to be emotionally touched and motivationally aroused by 
whatever commands our loving affection for the past. 
 
Let me now integrate these considerations into the problem of liberating the creative will 
from its impotent and hateful regard for the past. My claim is that the thing that’s higher than all 
reconciliation with time and that Zarathustra learns through his encounter with eternal recurrence 
is love for the past. The creative will needs to liberate itself from its hatred of the past that threatens 
to break its wings and that weighs it down, making it crawl around, soiling what it gnaws with 
gnashing teeth of impotence. Indeed, this hatred has become a spirit of revenge (and a spirit of 
gravity) that now prevents the will from moving forward, anchoring it—in impotent regard—to the 
past, and tempting it to transform itself into a not-willing-anymore. Transmuting this hatred into 
love allows the creative will to relate itself to the past (hence, to will backwards) with different eyes, 
releasing it from its anchor of hatred, and enabling it to fly-off into the future with newly restored 
wings. In my view, love of the past is a kind of backward-willing with a forward intent. The thing in 
the past that lowers our emotional defenses, which had been raised by our hatred, is the thing that 
then propels us forward, or at the very least, that we carry forward as we get on with our lives. This 
“carrying forward” will continue to have the past in sight, or at least that in it which commands our 
love. What’s interesting about this emotional alchemy of transmuting hatred into love is that 
developing a loving disposition to the past need not imply that one stops hating it. What it does 
imply is that one’s hatred has been overcome by one’s love, which now extends itself over the past 
in a sufficiently ample emotional tent to be able to encompass and surpass one’s hatred through a 
surfeit of positive emotion. The reason this is possible is that what commands one’s love of the 
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past—propelling one forward into the future—need not be the same thing that makes one hate the 
past. 
 
 I haven’t really said what about the past commands our love, nor have I explained how 
eternal recurrence could be implicated in our falling in love with it. Although here I cannot fully 
delve into this question, let me conclude this section by registering where I think the answer lies. In 
my preliminary approximation to the very thorny problem of eternal recurrence, I argued that it 
can be understood as a parable about the (pro)creative will itself, the will to power, which is the 
fundamental engine of all life that’s constantly resurrected and returns to its self-same life in all its 
transitory transformations through the stream of time and becoming (Zamosc 2015b).
15
 Among the 
things that confrontation with this thought teaches Zarathustra is that the human being will never 
cease to be a mere transit or bridge, destined to find itself still human-all-too-human in all its 
attempts at growing “high beyond humans and animals” (Z.I, ‘Tree’; Z.III, ‘Convalescent’ 2). But, 
while initially this thought might make us weary and afraid that all our creative efforts are in vain, it 
can also—when properly incorporated into our lives—teach us to love our transitional destiny of 
forever remaining mere bridges to the superhuman. If it does, what we would’ve learned to love, 
through this process, is the creative will to power itself, of which we are self-conscious surrogates 
while we remain in existence. Thus, on my reading, love of the past is really love of what in the 
past was creative will to power, which will recur eternally in the stream of time. 
 
Since the will to power is just the engine of all life, love of the past is also equivalent to love 
of life; love of that aspect in the past that’s not gone because it’s essential and unburiable—because, 
as Nietzsche puts it, referring to his own past in Eccce Homo, “whatever was life in it has been 
saved, is immortal” (EH, ‘Epigraph’; translation modified). This love liberates the creative will 
from its powerlessness with respect to the past, affording it the freedom to fulfill its redemptive 
function, which Zarathustra at one point describes thus: “All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a grisly 
accident—until the creating will says to it: ‘But thus I willed it’. Until the creative will says to it: ‘But 
thus I will it! Thus shall I will it!” (Z.II, ‘Redemption’; translation modified). What I interpret the 
 
15
 My solution to the problem of backward willing doesn’t depend on the truth of cosmological recurrence 
because love of life is achieved by thinking about what’s true in the parable, namely, that what literally recurs eternally 
the same is the operations of the will to power itself, rather than its particular expressions which are finite and, 
perhaps, unrepeatable. Still, my interpretation can incorporate desire for this latter kind of cosmological recurrence as 
confirmation that one has indeed already achieved love of life (GS 341). 
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will to will here, in these three temporal modes of past, present, and future, is itself: its creative 
activity of being a (pro)creative will. Of course, in willing its creative activity and self across and 
through time, the will is subject to the accidental nature of becoming, which can manifest itself in 
the fact that the particulars of its creative activity may be something that it could come to regret. 
We don’t have absolute control of our creative willing, and this means that we might feel 
dissatisfied by its results. By reflecting on what’s eternal in its own nature (by thinking through the 
thought of eternal recurrence) the creative will can learn to achieve reconciliation with its 
shortcomings, to let go of the past; but it can also achieve something higher than all “letting go”, 
namely love, which allows it to overcome its past shortcomings by carrying forward that which is 
still lovable in them: itself. 
 
Love of the past or love of life is, therefore, a form of self-love.
16
 But, importantly, it’s not a 
narrowly egoistic one. What one loves, after all, is that aspect of oneself that’s also in everything 
else that is, or was, or will be in existence. Moreover, because human beings are self-conscious 
surrogates of the creative will to power, in our particular case our self-love involves the recognition 
of this self-conscious surrogacy, this humanity, in each other.
 
Through this love, then, we learn that 
we are not alone.
17
 In my view, this is why Zarathustra uses the metaphor of the “rainbow bridge” 
in his convalescent speech when referring to eternal recurrence and the love of life it enables. This 
theme had been prefigured by some of  Zarathustra’s earlier remarks. In the Prologue he had said: 
“I shall join the creators, the harvesters the celebrators: I shall show them the rainbow and all the 
steps to the superhuman” (Z.I, ‘Prologue’ 9; translation modified); and in an important moment in 
the second book we had read: “For that mankind be redeemed from revenge: that to me is the 
bridge to the highest hope and a rainbow after long thunderstorms” (Z.I, ‘Tarantulas’). Now 
convalescing, after confronting eternal recurrence, he tells his animals that each human being is a 
world in itself and that we all seem eternally separated from each other, despite the fact that, in 
reality, we are also most similar to each other. The gap that separates us, then, is really tiny and yet 
the most difficult to bridge. We can, nonetheless, bridge this gap with the help of Zarathustra’s 
poetic words that seek to communicate his newly learned love of life. Hence his claim that “with 
 
16
 It heeds, thereby, Zarathustra’s teaching that “whoever wants to become light and a bird must love himself”; 
a lesson that, significantly—given the issue of moving the unmovable stone that’s the past—, follows the claim that 
“whoever one day teaches humans to fly, will have shifted all boundary stones” (Z III. ‘Gravity’ 2). 
17
 This love enables, then, Zarathustra’s neighborly love which consists in loving your neighbor as you love 
yourself (Z.III, ‘Virtue’ 3). 
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sounds our love dances on colorful rainbows” (Z.III, ‘Convalescent’ 2). The love of life that we 
learn through eternal recurrence is an ecumenical love that connects us to each other, through its 
rainbow bridges, by means of the mutual recognition that it commands in us of what’s the same in 
all of us: the creative will itself and its ability to self-overcome. By connecting us to each other, this 
love enables us to pursue the ideal of the superhuman: i.e., the ennoblement and elevation of that 
aspect of ourselves that’s unburiable, even if we ourselves are not. We’ll perish, but our love will 
live on in others who, inspired and invigorated by our efforts, can keep on pushing, keep on 




5. Conclusion: Humanity’s Murmuration 
 
The association of rainbow bridges to eternal recurrence is accompanied by the idea that a 
kind of artistic engineering is required to build these ties of humanly and superhumanly love. 
Zarathustra’s poetic words concerning eternal recurrence, and the sounds of love with which he 
hopes to teach us how to dance on the tightrope that hangs over the abyss of our deep woe, are 
illusory and lying words (Z.III, ‘Convalescent’ 2).
19
 With these artistic instruments a kind of 
performative experience is built into the book, so that—as commentators have noted—Zarathustra 
enacts the experience of thinking through and incorporating eternal recurrence himself. I’ll follow 
those who suggest that these various stylistic and artistic tropes have some kind of didactic 
function.
20
 Nietzsche intended Zarathustra as a propaedeutic to the art of loving life. The artistic 
elements are there to make Zarathustra’s teachings, particularly, that of eternal recurrence, the 
object of an active willing on the part of the reader, rather than a mere passive exercise of detached 
intellectual spectatorship. Accordingly—and against Stegmaier’s (2013) suggestion that they are 
meant to liberate the teacher—the poetic, sometimes apparently contradictory, aspects of the book 





 Nietzsche praises solitude and is critical of herd mentality, but his goal always includes building a higher, 
nobler community (Z.I. ‘Bestowing’ 2; Cf. UM III.5, UM IV.4). While love of humanity facilitates that project, it 
shouldn’t be confused with impotent Christian love of humanity (BGE 104; Z.I, ‘Neighbor’; GM I.8, 14-15). The 
Nietzschean love of humanity is for the sake of the superhuman, which is the “higher tendency” that gives this love the 
“subtlety and ambergris” that will allow us to fly higher than any person has ever flown (BGE 60). 
19
 Although this touches on the thorny issue of falsification, I’ll bracket the problem and focus instead on how 
the artistic elements mentioned advance Zarathustra’ pedagogical function. Hatab (2018) tries to articulate a positive 
notion of falsification in Zarathustra. 
20
 Cf. Stegmaier 2013; Skowron 2004. 
21
 Cf. Zamosc 2015a: 265-6, n.42 
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Nietzsche considered Zarathustra his most important book because with it he wanted to gift 
humankind the type of artistic experience that, in his youth, he had argued Greek tragedy afforded 
its audiences: a transfiguring experience that, once incorporated, injects you back into the world 
with a renewed sense of purpose; the purpose of augmenting nature by attempting to live an 
ennobled existence that can embellish not just your own egoistic life, but humankind itself. The 
thought of eternal recurrence figures prominently in this pedagogical exercise and organizes the 
book as a whole. 
 
Thus, on my view, eternal recurrence is required for there to be any transhumanist 
progress, not because this doctrine teaches us the type of control over time that would be needed 
to take charge of our own evolutionary process—as Loeb believes (Loeb 2017: 95-6)—but, rather, 
because it teaches us the kind of love for our humanity that will enable us to pursue its  highest 
hope: the ideal of the superhuman. To learn this sort of love is to make ourselves vulnerable to the 
fact that we can’t have absolute control over the contingencies of nature; it’s to reconcile ourselves 
to the notion that our efforts at self-overcoming might fall prey to the vicissitudes of time and 
becoming in such a way that we might come to regret them.
22
 But through our love, we can achieve 
something higher than all reconciliation by learning to move on and carry forward the 
commanding affection we have for the free creative will that we incarnate and that’s the same in all 
of us. This love teaches us to take joy and comfort in human freedom itself and its effects, even its 
tragic ones. While our love doesn’t eradicate our hatred for the past, it provides a force field that 
keeps the gnawing worm of guilt, sin, and resentment from spoiling the fruit of our volitional 
faculties, so that, like the convalescent Zarathustra after his encounter with eternal recurrence, we 
too can enjoy the pleasant smell of the rosy apple of our creative freedom (Z.III, ‘Convalescent’ 2; 
‘Longing’). 
 
Learning this kind of love seems especially urgent for a movement like the transhumanist, 
which often seems on the brink of being consumed by its darker side. Some of the most visible 
voices within transhumanism are libertarian ideologues that subscribe to an exacerbated egocentric 
ethics, in which anything that stands in the way of their narrow vision of personal aggrandizement 
 
22
 This love promotes the ethical program of thinking mortal thoughts that Nussbaum recommends as 
corrective against godlike transhumanism (Nussbaum 1990: 389). 
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through technologically enabled godlike capabilities ought to be destroyed. Against this kind of 
unfettered individualism and its myopic negative freedoms, Zarathustra teaches the love that 
doesn’t free us from intervention by others, but actually opens us up to each other’s hearts, 
connecting us through our mutual recognition of what’s eternal, universal, and the same in all of 
us: the self-conscious, intentional, creative will to power itself. This uniting and unifying love 
doesn’t just make us hostage to fortune, but liberates us from it, by allowing us to recognize that we 
are not alone. It’s the kind of love with which we can grow the spiritual wings needed to dance in 
that dance floor for the divine dice throws of time and becoming that Zarathustra calls the sky-
chance, and also the sky-innocence, the sky-mischief (Z.III, ‘Sunrise’). 
 
And here I detect an important disanalogy between the educational experience that 
Zarathustra affords, and technological interventions like those envisioned by transhumanists. 
Genuine pedagogical interventions of the kind that Zarathustra aspires to be are liberatory in the 
sense that they require the active participation of the learner, who must freely incorporate the 
lessons that are imparted to him through his own efforts, thereby intensifying the very freedom 
that’s being summoned to accomplish this learning. The same need not be true of all technological 
interventions. Taking a pill can, of course, sometimes enhance our freedom, when it helps remove 
psychological or physiological barriers to it. But it can also rob us of our sense of freedom by 
making us feel that we have surrendered it to an external force. To me this danger looms 
somewhat more menacingly in the case of love.
23
 Realizing that our love is not really sustained by 
our own efforts but is instead the product of a pill, or some other technological device, might raise 
the suspicion that our love is not genuine but artificially produced. There’s thus an advantage in 
pursuing the pedagogical program Nietzsche intended in writing Zarathustra. By incorporating the 
book’s lessons, we can truly enhance our sense of freedom instead of diminishing it. We can also 
learn to love life in a way that can more reliably rescue us from the spirit of revenge that threatens 
to consume us, even if we are unaware of it. For, at the same time that this love makes us 
vulnerable to time and to each other, it also connects us and gives us the strength needed to 
continue climbing in the direction of the superhuman in the knowledge that, despite our 
limitations, our efforts will live on in the loving regard of those that will succeed us. 
 
23
 Nyholm (2015) usefully discusses some of the ways in which enhancement-sustained love attachments can 
be less desirable than the intrinsic good of love. 
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Murmuration is that well-known phenomenon by means of which a flock of birds is able to 
fly through the sky in swooping, intricate, ever-changing, and harmonious patterns. Nietzsche’s 
hope in writing Zarathustra was to create an artistic work of joyful science and philosophy that 
could free us to pursue the superhuman ideal that gives a new meaning and direction to the earth, 
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